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NON-TRANSPARENT PBM CASH FLOWS: 
BALANCING MARKET FORCES UNDER A 
RELUCTANT LEGISLATIVE REGIME 
JOHN MCGUINNESS* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) have 
been subject to increasing regulation in efforts to protect consumers 
from rising drug prices. Although regulation is needed to control 
PBMs’ unique market position, the pharmaceutical industry con-
tinues to suffer at the expense of consumer choice. Legislation varies 
between jurisdictions and fails to account for market realities. 
Recent state proposals attempting to weaponize free market ideals 
have either failed to obtain the requisite vote or are falsely ac-
cused of government overreach hiding behind the veil of market-
based propositions. 
This Note will examine the PBM transaction and explain why 
a regulatory regime aimed to restore consumer choice and indus-
try transparency will produce optimal market conditions without 
stifling competition. 
                                                                                                             
* JD Candidate 2020, William & Mary Law School; BS 2017, Christopher 
Newport University. I wish to thank Amanda VanInwegen for her insightful 
comments and unwavering support. I also wish to thank my family, specifically 
Brendan, Jackie, and Rosemary, for their constant love, guidance, and en-
couragement throughout all my academic endeavors. Lastly, thank you to the 
staff and editors of the William & Mary Business Law Review for their con-
tributions in editing this Note for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Attempting to benefit from economies of scale,1 the pharma-
ceutical industry took a good idea, pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs), and turned it into a complex series of transactions at the 
expense of market transparency and consumer choice. PBMs are 
the middlemen of the prescription drug industry, contracted by 
health plans, employers, and government entities to manage pre-
scription drug programs on behalf of health plan beneficiaries.2 
Specifically, PBMs are contracted to administer prescription drug 
plans because they are vested with negotiating power to secure re-
bates and discounts from drug manufacturers.3 Under these bilat-
eral market conditions, middlemen narrow the available sets of 
buyers and sellers, which improves consumer welfare if the market 
search is costly and inefficient.4 However, in the case of prescription 
drugs, PBMs conceal information and raise consumer costs as a 
consequence of the market’s “extensive ... contract negotiation, 
cost-benefit analysis, corporate haggling, manufacturer rebates, 
and the artful salesmanship of pharmacy benefit managers.”5 
 Although some scholars argue PBM deficiencies are sys-
tematic and therefore require direct regulation, this Note posits 
significant federal initiatives will only dirty the already murky 
water of the complex pharmaceutical market.6 These regulations 
overlook market realities and fail to acknowledge that PBMs are 
merely one cog in the wheel of the prescription drug industry.7 
Accordingly, this Note examines the pharmacy benefit manage-
ment industry, identifies unfair trading practices in concealment 
                                                                                                             
1 Economy of scale, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2011). 
2 Mark Meador, Squeezing the Middleman: Ending Underhanded Dealing in 
the Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry Through Regulation, 20 ANNALS. 
HEALTH L. 77, 77–78 (2011) (explaining PBMs role in “coordinat[ing] the sale 
and reimbursement of prescription drugs between health insurance plan spon-
sors or employers, drug manufacturers, and local and national pharmacies”). 
3 Regina Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 323, 328 (2002). 
4 Abdullah Yavaü, Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets, 12 J. OF LAB. 
ECON. 406, 408 (1994). 
5 Meador, supra note 2, at 77. 
6 But see Meador, supra note 2, at 78; see also infra Part III. 
7 Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the 
Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 33, 78 (2007). 
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of information, and reevaluates the necessary levels of interven-
tion in creating efficient market inputs and outputs, enabling 
parties to arrive at an economically efficient solution.8 In conclu-
sion, this Note will explain how restructured contract incentives 
support both transactional efficiency and market morality.9 
I.PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER INDUSTRY 
A.Industry Structure and Composition 
 According to the Office of Policy Planning, roughly 95 percent 
of insured Americans have prescription drug coverage adminis-
tered through a PBM.10 Specifically, three large PBMs control 
approximately 80 percent of the PBM market, consisting of at 
least 180 million lives in the United States.11 At its inception, 
PBM transactions were arranged to “negotiat[e] discounts with 
pharmacies and manufacturers, substitut[e] less expensive drug 
alternatives ... and fill[ ] prescriptions for chronic conditions by 
mail ....”12 Nevertheless, PBMs leveraged their negotiating power 
and market control at the expense of consumer choice and mar-
ket transparency.13 
                                                                                                             
8 See generally Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets, 
in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 82–84 
(Williamson et al., ed., 1993); RONALD H. COASE, THE NATURE OF THE FIRM (1937). 
9 See infra Part V. 
10 Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Dir., Office of Policy Planning, 
Fed. Trade Comm’s et al. to Senator Richard L. Brown, North Dakota Senate 4 
(Mar. 8, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_doc 
uments/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-richard-l.brown-concerning-north-dakota  
-h.b.1332-regulate-contractual-relationship-between-pharmacy-benefit-manag 
ers-and-covered-entities/050311northdakotacomnts.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM 
P2-X5MY]. 
11 THE STATE OF COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACY BENEFITS MANAGER AND 
PHARMACY MARKETPLACES: HEARING BEFORE THE H. JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON 
REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW (2016) (statement of 
David Balto, private antitrust attorney and antitrust enforcer for the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission), https://docs.house.gov 
/meetings/JU/JU05/20151117/104193/HHRG-114-JU05-Wstate-BaltoD-20151 
117.pdf [https://perma.cc/88DE-AHYN]. 
12 Joanna Shepherd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers by a Market Adversary, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 
2 (2013) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE 14, 40 tbl. 6 (2002)). 
13 See infra Part II.  
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B.PBM Profit Optimization 
 PBM business models are built around different pricing 
mechanisms.14 “There are three price measures that are im-
portant in understanding the payment system for prescription 
drugs in the retail pharmacy market: the average manufacturer 
price (AMP), the wholesale acquisition cost (WAC), and the av-
erage wholesale price (AWP).”15 The AMP is the price paid by 
PBMs to either the manufacturer or retail pharmacies that buy 
directly from the manufacturers,16 whereas, the WAC denotes 
the manufacturer’s price list for sales of a specific drug.17 Lastly, 
the AWP is an illustrative pricing list for a drug sold by whole-
salers to retail pharmacies or nonretail providers.18 To aid our 
understanding of the entire transaction, the Congressional Budget 
Office has published the following diagram19: 
                                                                                                             
14 Meador, supra note 2, at 79. 
15 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING IN THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 3 (2007), Pub. No. 2703, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files 
/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/01-03-prescriptiondrug.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/F3JT-TZX2]. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 5. 
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 Before departing from the mechanics of PBM pricing mod-
els, it is necessary to address the consequences of spread pricing. 
Generally, spread pricing is where PBMs mark up the difference 
between the amount they reimburse pharmacies for a drug and the 
amount charged to its clients.20 According to Bloomberg, “[s]pread 
pricing is a practice that’s most common with generic drugs, which 
make up almost 90 percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the 
U.S.”21 As a practical matter, PBMs negotiate with manufacturers 
using a lower-quoted price, while setting reimbursement rates with 
plan sponsors using higher price listings, and therefore entrench 
sizable profits.22 
 In a subsequent Bloomberg study of ninety generic drugs, 
“PBMs and pharmacies siphoned off $1.3 billion of the $4.2 bil-
lion Medicaid insurers spent on the drugs in 2017.”23 Generally, 
                                                                                                             
20 Robert Langreth et al., The Secret Drug Pricing System Middlemen Use 
to Rake in Millions, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/graphics/2018-drug-spread-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/5CJA-2FGA].  
21 Id. 
22 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 40. 
23 Langreth et al., supra note 20. 
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the highest markups follow the introduction of new generic drugs.24 
Illustrated in the chart below, Ohio’s Medicaid plan providing 
for generic versions of the Novartis AG’s leukemia pill, Gleevec, 
saw as much as $3,000 in spread pricing fees.25 
 
 While the Gleevec spread does not “distinguish between how 
much of the [spread] markup is going to the pharmacies and how 
much is retained by PBMs,” independent pharmacists claim the 
additional revenue is not returned to the pharmacy.26 Further-
more, “four out of five Medicaid managed-care plans” are controlled 
by CVS, which contracts with private insurers and “cover[s] roughly 
90 percent of the state’s 2.8 million ... Medicaid beneficiaries.”27 
 In other words, CVS’s statewide control has enabled them 
to keep their spread pricing a trade secret.28 According to CVS, “re-
vealing pricing details would keep it from getting the best rates, 
and that money it makes on spreads pays for other services the 
company provides.”29 However, in response to repeated state 
contests concerning CVS’s industry practice, Ohio obtained the 
                                                                                                             
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Langreth et al., supra note 20. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
296 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:289 
spread statistics and determined the hidden fees paid by the 
state “amounted to $223.7 million in a 12-month period.”30 Im-
mediately following this report, the Ohio legislature mandated the 
managed-care plans to terminate spread pricing contracts for 
2019.31 In conclusion, Bloomberg suggests “that PBMs, not phar-
macies, have been getting most of the markups on generic drugs 
in Ohio.”32 Despite legislative efforts to eliminate spread pricing, 
PBMs are still utilizing similar pricing strategies and secretly 
exploiting drug costs to their advantage.33 
 More recently, President Donald Trump signed the Know 
the Lowest Price Act and the Patients’ Right to Know Drug Prices 
Act.34 While these legislative initiatives will be discussed in Part 
III,35 this subsection will briefly discuss their effect on PBMs’ 
pricing strategies. Specifically, the legislation invalidated PBM 
“gag” clauses, which “prevent pharmacists from informing patients 
if a prescription would be cheaper if purchased out-of-pocket.”36 
For purposes of this section, the legislation is a step in the right 
direction as it restores market power to the consumer.37 The 
legislation also cuts against the negative externalities of PBM 
“take-it-or-leave-it contracts.”38 The legislation rearranges con-
tract incentives and encourages negotiation between pharmacists 
and PBMs.39 Nonetheless, these rearrangements are rendered 
                                                                                                             
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Brittany Shoot, Trump Signs 2 Drug Pricing Bills, HHS Secretary 
Promises ‘More to Come,’ FORTUNE (Oct. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10 
/11/trump-administration-gag-clause-compare-prescription-prices/ [https://perma 
.cc/3P3Y-MH53]. 
35 See infra Part III. 
36 Shoot, supra note 34. 
37 Your pharmacist’s hands may be tied when it comes to telling you drug 
prices, DIABETES PATIENT ADVOCACY COALITION (May 4, 2018), http://diabetes 
pac.org/pbm-gag-clauses-tie-pharmacists-hands/ [https://perma.cc/8YYC-PTGC] 
(“When the patient goes to the pharmacy to purchase their prescription medi-
cine, they pay their copay price, believing that they are getting a good deal 
through their insurance ... [when] in actuality, they may be better off skip-
ping their insurance and paying the listed price.”). 
38 Id. (explaining if “pharmacists refuse[ ] to sign the contract because it 
includes a gag order, the PBM will simply take its business to the next phar-
macy in town.”). 
39 Shoot, supra note 34. 
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useless if PBMs continue to exploit other contract techniques in 
negotiations.40 
C.Inefficient Bilateral Market Conditions 
 PBMs negotiating power and in-house pricing schemes have 
allowed them to position themselves upon two sides of an inter-
mediate market bilateral oligopoly.41 In simplistic terms, a bilateral 
oligopoly “is a market game with two commodities, allowing 
strategic behavior on both sides of the market ... [and] when the 
number of buyers is large, ... [the] oligopoly[, the PBM,] approx-
imates a game of quantity.”42 In PBM markets, the concentrated 
buyers and sellers are not equally equipped to reach bilateral 
efficiency.43 Moreover, some economists argue bilateral oligopolies 
promote market efficiency because “downstream firms” demand 
is met on a reoccurring basis.44 However, this is not the case as 
applied to PBMs market negotiations.45 The PBM industry is not 
composed of the assumed set of buyer-seller pairs enabled to 
negotiate, as Part II will explain its inefficiencies.46 
 Under ideal market conditions, buyers and sellers are 
properly equipped to negotiate and exchange rights under mu-
tually agreeable terms for a specified period of time.47 Presuming 
the bilateral nature of PBM contracts, they must “consist[ ] of 
mutual promises to do some future act, and the consideration of the 
promise of one party is a promise on the part of the other.”48 Part II 
will identify concerns, beyond the scope of contract negotiations, 
                                                                                                             
40 DIABETES PATIENT ADVOCACY COALITION, supra note 37. 
41 Henry Waxman, Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century 
Hearings, F.T.C. 1 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents 
/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0053-d-0016-154973.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C 
VH-7W3G]. 
42 Alex Dickson et al., Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition, 52 
ECONOMIC THEORY 979, 979 (2013). 
43 Johan Stennek et al., Bilateral oligopoly: WZB Discussion Paper No. FS 
IV 01-08, ECONSTOR 1, 3 (2001) (defining bilateral efficiency as a contract which 
“maximizes the sum of the two firms’ profits”). 
44 Id. at 4. 
45 See infra Part II. 
46 Id. 
47 Stennek et al., supra note 43, at 4. 
48 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 8 (2018). 
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regarding PBMs’ industry practices and discuss the need for limited 
intervention utilizing the Coase Theorem. 
II.RELATED INDUSTRY CONCERNS 
A.Formulary Control 
 In addition to their pricing mechanisms, “PBMs ... amplify 
the benefits of rebate concealment and spread profits through the 
careful construction of formularies.”49 A formulary is created by 
the PBM and enumerates which drugs are covered and their 
corresponding co-pay costs.50 This arrangement restructures 
incentives and encourages PBMs to provide the drugs that offer 
greater yields from rebates and profits.51 As illustrated using 
basic economics, “assume drug A costs $50 and the PBM will keep 
$5 of the rebate from the manufacturer, while drug B costs $100 
and the PBM will keep $6 of the rebate.”52 Consequently, despite 
drug A being more cost efficient for the plan sponsor, the PBM 
has an incentive to sell drug B in order to optimize rebates con-
tributing to its own profits.53 
 PBM manipulation of formularies reaches even farther 
than rudimentary economics. PBMs have concocted their own 
incentive programs to ensure formulary compliance.54 For ex-
ample, PBMs may pay pharmacists bonus fees whenever they 
convince a physician to prescribe a formulary drug.55 Conse-
quently, incentives become even more intertwined and pushed 
down the supply chain as some pharmacists might be incentiv-
ized to act in their own self-interest. Specifically, a pharmacist 
might notify a physician that the drug he or she prescribed is 
                                                                                                             
49 Meador, supra note 2, at 83. 
50 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 44. 
51 Pharmacy Benefit Mgmt. Inst., Prescription Drug Benefit Cost and Plan 
Design Report 20 (2008–09) (on file with author) (explaining the effects of formu-
lary design, and suggesting the mistrust between pharmacies and PBMs make it 
easier for PBMs to exploit their financial relationship and possess nearly complete 
control of formulary list). 
52 Meador, supra note 2, at 83. 
53 Id. 
54 Andrew S. Krulwich, The Response to Health Care Reform by the Phar-
maceutical Industry, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 2 (1995). 
55 Id. 
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not on the formulary and subsequently convince the physician to 
prescribe the formulary drug instead.56 Furthering this line of 
logic, drug manufacturers are also incentivized to “have their 
products placed on a formulary.”57 As a result, manufacturers are 
more inclined to offer generous rebates to a PBM in exchange for 
formulary placement or offer the PBM volume discounts when 
purchasing certain drugs.58 Therefore, the logic is circular, and 
no entity has an incentive to provide oversight of PBM activity. 
 As a result of PBMs murky dealings and unequal negoti-
ating power, they have control over such formulary lists when 
trading with pharmacies.59 Notably, legislation has not attempted 
to address this issue.60 As described in Part III, this matter is 
best addressed using a market-based approach, provided formu-
laries are determined through a series of negotiations, and cannot 
be addressed through aggressive price regulation.61 
B.Undercutting Pharmacies: Mail-Order Production 
 Mail-order pharmacies are controlled by PBMs and prom-
ise consumers lower co-pays and convenient service.62 However, 
                                                                                                             
56 Bruce N. Kuhlik, The FDA’s Regulation of Pharmaceutical Communica-
tions in the Context of Managed Care: A Suggested Approach, 50 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 23, 30 (1995). 
57 Ruth B. Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceu-
tical Benefit Management Industry: A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld 
Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 318 (1996). 
58 Id. (citing Kuhlik, supra note 56, at 31; Robert Marks, Managed Care 
Perspectives, MANAGED CARE WK. 3 (Dec. 5, 1994)). 
59 Id. at 319–20.  
60 Shoot, supra note 34 (Trump’s executive orders address pricing discrim-
ination after the contract has been created). 
61 Id.; see generally Marcelle Arak et al., There is a better way to fix our 
broken ‘free market’ for drugs than negotiating prices, MARKETWATCH (Jan 31, 
2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/there-is-a-better-way-to-fix-our-broken 
-free-market-for-drugs-than-negotiating-prices-2017-01-20 [https://perma.cc/D4 
LH-K8ST] (explaining why market-based solutions are better suited for nego-
tiating parties). 
62 F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER 
PHARMACIES (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports 
/pharmacy-benefit-managers-ownership-mail-order-pharmacies-federal-trade 
-commission-report/050906pharmbenefitrpt_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FMU-CM3K] 
[hereinafter F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS]. 
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mail-order pharmacies merely functioned as another profit-
producing utility exploited by PBMs.63 Perhaps even more trou-
bling, mail-order pharmacies enable a PBM to control the supply 
of drugs to its own pharmacies, thereby cutting out competitors 
and optimizing its profits under higher spreads and rebates from 
drug manufacturers.64 Mail-order pharmacies have even gone so 
far as to contact doctors and persuade them to switch patients to 
an alternative drug which has a higher spread price.65 According 
to the FTC, mail-order pharmacies could be manipulated by PBMs 
to “increase costs and generate additional profits ….”66 Federal 
agencies have not correctly analyzed PBM mail-order pharma-
cies, and without proper market constraints, it is unclear whether 
PBMs are favoring mail-order pharmacies in ways contrary to 
the plan sponsor’s interest.67 
C.Judicial Challenges to Unfair Trading Practices 
 It is not a new concept that PBMs are in a dangerous po-
sition, as PBMs have been alleged to make illegal attempts to 
monopolize in violation of federal antitrust legislation.68 In 2006, 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania consolidated six antitrust 
challenges alleging PBMs conspired to fix prices and monopolize 
the insurance-covered drug industry.69 The Judicial Panel Mul-
tidistrict Litigation found the “actions in th[e] litigation involve 
common questions of fact, and that centralization ... will serve 
the convenience of the parties ....”70 Specifically, in one of the 
consolidated cases, an independent pharmacy alleged the PBMs 
                                                                                                             
63 See Jeffrey S. Baird, What to Know About Working with PBMs, PHARMACY 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/what-to-know-about 
-working-with-pbms [https://perma.cc/T9AX-DTAS]. 
64 Garret & Garis, supra note 7, at 67 (noting PBMs’ competition-eliminating 
activity is at the expense of the consumer because they redirect product to 
their own pharmacies, even if the competitor could provide it at a lower cost). 
65 Johnson, supra note 3, at 332; see also Meador, supra note 2, at 84. 
66 F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS, supra note 62, at i. 
67 Id. 
68 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006) (Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contract-
ing or conspiring in ways that restrict trade). 
69 See In re Pharm. Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d. 1352, 
1352–54 (J.P.M.L. 2006). 
70 Id. 
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were involved in illegal “parallel behavior.”71 Plaintiffs contend that 
“plan sponsors share, and are aware that they share, a common 
strategy ... utiliz[ing] a PBM to combine purchasing power and 
drive down pharmacy costs.”72 Underpinning the concerns in this 
Note, the complaint states the following: 
PBMs ... remov[e] the need and existence for any market whereby 
they must compete in order to secure the services of pharmacist[s] 
to service their insured ... [thus,] removal of this market and con-
ferring of the aggregate power to negotiate these services upon ... 
PBMs amounts to horizontal price fixing as it allows for the 
stabilization and repression of the fees pharmacists would be 
able to charge in a free and open market.73 
 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, 
Northeastern Division, denied the PBMs motion to dismiss and the 
case is pending upon grant of Plaintiff’s motion to certify the action 
as a class action.74 However, Judge Hopkins noted, “by conspiring 
to hold down prices paid to independent pharmacies (among other 
alleged actions), PBMs [would] bankrupt those pharmacies, thereby 
capturing a larger segment of the insurance-paid prescription 
market for the PBMs’ own prescription-dispensing business and 
allowing the PBMs to charge higher prices for that service.”75 
 The court’s conclusions later appeared in the House Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy Hearing, 
regarding antitrust effects on healthcare providers.76 According to 
the Committee, “PBMs have substantial monopsony or oligopsony 
power and are able to use this power to reduce compensation which 
harms the ability of community pharmacies to provide adequate 
services.”77 While N. Jackson did not result in direct punitive 
                                                                                                             
71 N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d. 1279, 
1284 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (citing SAC Compl. at 53). 
72 Id. at 1294. 
73 Id.  
74 N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., Nos. CV-03-2696-VEH, 
CV-03-2697-VEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98774, at *36 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006). 
75 N. Jackson Pharm., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d. at 1292. 
76 Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Health Care Providers, Insurers and 
Patients: Hearing before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Competition 
Policy, 111th Cong. 127–28 (2010) (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, 
Ctr. for Am. Progress Action Fund) [hereinafter Antitrust Laws and Their Effects 
on Health Care Providers, Insurers and Patients].  
77 Id.  
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damages, it shed light on the unclear PBM market and coercive 
concentration of market power. As discussed above, N. Jackson 
triggered the Committee’s recognition of the “critical link” phar-
macists have in effective healthcare management.78 However, the 
Healthcare Guidelines do not address collaboration by pharmacies, 
and consequently raise antitrust obstacles to pharmacists.79 In 
fact, the Committee noted the “FTC has approved ... [three] phar-
macy joint ventures to provide health care services under the 
Guidelines [but] none in the past decade.”80 Consequently, 
pharmacists’ unique connection with consumers is untapped and 
under-utilized to restore consumer purchasing power. 
 In addition to these consolidated cases, the patchwork of 
various state and federal laws have left the industry to its own 
correcting mechanics.81 Part III82 will discuss specific regulatory 
initiatives. However, Congress has established anti-kickback 
rules, targeted fraudulent PBM activity under the False Claims 
Act (FCA), and attempted to apply a liability regime under 
ERISA.83 Intertwined with federal initiatives, lies state regula-
tory attempts to control the PBM market. For example, Kansas 
and “[n]umerous other states have passed statutes ... requiring 
PBMs to register with the state’s insurance commissioner.”84 Maine 
went so far as to mandate that “PBMs are fiduciaries and must act 
‘with care, skill, prudence and diligence and in accordance with 
the standards of conduct applicable to a fiduciary in an enter-
prise of like character and with like aims.’”85 
 These mixed federal and state efforts resulted in frequent 
litigation and ultimately produced “slow and inconsistent ap-
proaches” to major anticompetitive behavior.86 Accordingly, while 
these cases highlight major market deficiencies, at their best, 
                                                                                                             
78 Antitrust Laws and Their Effects on Health Care Providers, Insurers and 
Patients, supra note 76, at 127. 
79 Id. (explaining since pharmacies only dispense and do not prescribe, 
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judicial remedies fail to uniformly address underlying market con-
cerns and burden retail pharmacies to pursue costly litigation.87 
III.FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES 
A.Federal 
 The Federal government has taken notice of PBMs’ unequal 
bargaining power and has invested considerable resources in 
addressing market deficiencies.88 Notably, Congress passed the 
Medicare Modernization Act, which mandates that the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) analyze the PBM mail-order system.89 
However, the FTC’s report found that PBMs’ self-dealing had no 
causal connection to higher prices.90 The FTC’s conclusion was 
challenged, and critics of the report stated that the Commission 
failed to understand the underlying economic issues of the PBM 
industry and only analyzed whether plan sponsors were over-
paying PBMs.91 
 The FCA has some bite, as its intention was to target 
PBM practices which may be fraudulent.92 In addition, the Anti-
Kickback Act of 1986 (AKA) prevents parties from contracting 
for preferential treatment.93 Even under the Medicaid rebate 
program, the PBM may be liable if it “overstate[s] the price offered 
to it by the manufacturer[, and] the PBM fails to take into account 
‘certain payments for benefits provided to PBMs by the pharma-
ceutical manufacturers ....’”94 Another source of liability is based 
                                                                                                             
87 Id. 
88 See Peri Iz, Study of Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry, 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION 41 (June 2001), https://www.cms 
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89 Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2174 (2004) 
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90 See F.T.C., PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS, supra note 62, at xi–xiv. 
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anti-kickback laws). 
92 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000). 
93 Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. § 53 (2010). 
94 Garrett & Garis, supra note 7, at 52 (quoting Sheehan, Prescription Drug 
Plans, Fraud Schemes, and the False Claims Act, 17 TAXPAYERS AGAINST 
FRAUD 18, 21 (1999)). 
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in the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO) where an Illinois U.S. District Court entertained a multi-
fraud challenge against a PBM.95 In Morse, the employer con-
tracted with a PBM which established a system “whereby the 
policyholder’s pharmacy, before releasing the prescription drug 
to the policyholder, accesses [the PBMs] system and finds out 
whether [the PBM] will provide 100 [percent] of the cost or 
whether the policyholder must copay 20 [percent] before receiving 
the prescription.”96 In other words, the pharmacy can profit im-
mediately upon the exchange so long as the policyholder is filling 
a brand name drug. Additionally, the employer is saving the PBM 
money, as it is not responsible for 20 percent of the drug expense. 
There, the court determined the employer and its contracted 
PBM entered into a scheme to “administer their prescription 
drug program in a manner which deprives policyholders of a 
benefit to which they are entitled and does so knowingly.”97 In 
conclusion, the court denied defendant’s motions and granted 
plaintiffs’ petition to proceed as a class action matter.98 
 Despite occasional judicial enforcement,99 these federal direc-
tives are inadequate unless fiduciary duties are applied to PBMs. 
Fiduciary responsibilities, as applied to PBMs, have been chal-
lenged under ERISA. According to the statute, “a fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to the plan solely in the interest of 
the participants and beneficiaries.”100 ERISA defines fiduciary as: 
[A] person ... with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exer-
cises any discretionary authority or discretionary control re-
specting management of such plan or exercises any authority 
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, 
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensa-
tion, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other 
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to 
                                                                                                             
95 Morse v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. 99-C-0193, 2000 WL 246245, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2000). 
96 Id. at *1. 
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99 See id. 
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do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretion-
ary responsibility in the administration of such plan ....101 
 PBMs have strongly contested their functions fall outside 
ERISA statutory interpretation because any alternative finding 
would subject them to a heightened degree of scrutiny.102 The 
Supreme Court explained the test for whether an entity is a 
fiduciary as one that depends on the entity’s control and author-
ity over the plan.103 Attempts to litigate PBMs as fiduciaries 
have been explored by the courts.104 For example, in Caremark, 
Inc., the Seventh Circuit denied ERISA liability.105 Specifically, 
the Seventh Circuit had to reconcile the following contract pro-
vision with that of ERISA’s fiduciary standard: “Caremark will 
use its best commercially reasonable efforts to negotiate these 
rates with existing pharmacies in [Carpenters’] network.”106 
However, even with the provision, Caremark could not negotiate 
AWP pricing, nor did the contract contain any mechanism for a 
pass-through of any additional savings Caremark managed to 
negotiate with retailers.107 Caremark was still “free to negotiate 
with retailers to pay less than the amount Carpenters would later 
reimburse it, allowing Caremark to pocket the difference.”108 
Ultimately, because Caremark’s bargain with the Carpenters was 
at arm’s length, Caremark owed no fiduciary duty.109 The court 
furthered its analysis and interpreted “commercially reasonable 
efforts” to carry little weight as Caremark was still equipped to 
                                                                                                             
101 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000). 
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“negotiate better prices with the retailers than a single client 
could negotiate.”110 
 PBMs have defensively relied on language within their plan 
sponsor contracts, which explicitly disclaim fiduciary status.111 
Part III will analyze whether PBMs’ contract defense is dispositive 
upon the question. However, courts have generally held PBMs’ 
activity falls short of the “discretionary authority or discretionary 
control over the management of the plan because the PBM was 
contractually prohibited from unilaterally changing negotiated drug 
prices with respect to the plan and was not contractually obligated 
to pass along to the plan the savings that the PBM negotiated 
with drug retailers.”112 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that “[b]y agreeing to pay a fixed amount to Caremark, Carpenters 
forwent its opportunity to garner any additional savings that 
Caremark could extract from retailers.”113 There was no provision 
in the contract that required specific dealings of rebates, and 
without fiduciary duties, there is no nexus to Carpenters’ claim 
for savings which the PBM managed to acquire.114 
 Subjecting PBMs as fiduciaries would protect against con-
troversial business practices, such as concealing spread cost, and 
structuring incentives to promote high cost formulary drugs.115 
Generally, the PBM would owe duties to plan sponsors and thereby 
beneficiaries of private health plans.116 As noted above, state juris-
dictions have passed statutes requiring the PBM to operate as a 
fiduciary.117 Notwithstanding judicial shortcomings, presuming 
PBMs operate as fiduciaries “raises a second issue: are state laws 
preempted by ERISA?”118 In re Express Scripts, Inc. PBM Litigation 
v. Local 153 Health Fund addressed the preemption issues and 
posited “whether the plan had standing to sue under ERISA section 
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1132 and whether Express Scripts was acting as a plan fiduci-
ary.”119 In In re Express Scripts, “[t]he plaintiff’s only assertion 
that might establish fiduciary status was that plaintiff was [func-
tioning as] a trustee.”120 Specifically, In re Express Scripts “con-
sidered whether a plan may bring an action for breach of fiduciary 
duty if it is not an enumerated party under section 1132(a)(2).”121 
The court sidestepped this issue and ruled on procedural grounds 
that “subject matter jurisdiction was not proper under ERISA.”122 
There, “the Eight Circuit [essentially] decided that a plan gen-
erally does not have standing as an entity to bring a cause of 
action under ERISA ... [but a]n exception to this rule may exist 
when the plan can establish that it is a fiduciary of itself.”123 
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
squared 1132(d)—which expressly granted plans a cause of action—
with 1132(a), concluding plans could exercise that right only when 
jurisdiction is proper.124 The plaintiff contended it was a trustee 
and thus established fiduciary status; however, the court held 
this assertion was unsubstantiated.125 The District Court went 
on to clarify that fiduciary duty actions could be entertained 
when brought by the proper party as a named fiduciary in the 
plan documents.126Other courts, particularly the District Court 
for the District of Columbia and the First Circuit, had differing 
conclusions in similar actions.127 Consequently, litigation efforts 
under ERISA “will have to be determined on a circuit-by-circuit 
basis” due to the lack of clear and effective market regulation.128 
 Although a notable procedural hurdle, “in most cases a 
plaintiff need not worry about this, because there will be a named 
fiduciary in the plan documents.”129 Thus, the named fiduciary 
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could “amend the complaint to name a proper plaintiff” via a 
plan trustee.130 Upon resolving questions of standing, the courts 
are still left with unresolved substantive matters: “whether the 
state law claims raised by the plaintiff were preempted and 
whether the PBM could be considered a fiduciary under ERISA.”131 
Under the Supreme Court holding in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 
state laws are preempted, however, the Court omitted “[t]he 
question of whether a PBM is a fiduciary.”132 
 In 2007, the Seventh Circuit did not apply fiduciary stand-
ards to a PBM as applied to its negotiation with retailers.133 The 
Circuit “reasoned that nothing in the contract between the plan 
and the PBM required the PBM to pass ... all savings obtained 
through its bargaining.”134 The Seventh Circuit’s holding, in 
conjunction with the Eight Circuit’s reasoning in In re Express 
Scripts, indicates that a prudent contract between the PBM and 
the plan could create fiduciary status.135 Consequently, the current 
precedent remains a question of contract interpretation. 
 Some scholars argue, “subject[ing] a PBM to excessive fi-
duciary duties would not be fair, as the PBM is a business and 
does not exist solely to reduce costs to the plan.”136 This proposition 
suggests courts should “consider the existing ERISA provisions in 
light of applicable public policy” in order to balance the PBMs self-
interest with its owed duty.137 This argument sets a dangerous 
invitation for the courts. Not only would it likely further incon-
sistent enforcement, but it encourages courts to engage in duties 
traditionally reserved to the legislature.138 At best, courts are 
left to judicial precedent as applied to “cases involving managed 
care organizations (MCOs) ... [which] favor[s] an MCO’s freedom 
to reduce health care costs by making determinations about how 
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much, and what kind of, care should be provided.”139 Without 
statutory framework, the courts are not yet equipped to assert 
authority in efforts to correct an unaccountable industry.140 
B.State 
 Various state agencies have also made attempts to regulate 
PBMs, including, “boards of pharmacy, state insurance commis-
sioners, and state Medicaid agencies.”141 These agencies are often 
limited in jurisdictional scope and have thus been ineffective in 
addressing the macroeconomic concerns raised herein. Although, 
legislatures have made direct attempts to regulate PBMs.142 For 
example, the District of Columbia passed a law requiring “[A PBM 
to act as] a fiduciary[,] ... [p]erform its duties with care, skill, pru-
dence, and diligence[,] ... notify the covered entity ... of any activity, 
policy or practice ... that directly or indirectly presents any con-
flict of interest[,]” and require various disclosures upon request 
of a covered entity.143 While research regarding these laws effec-
tiveness is limited, “in South Dakota ... well over $800,000 was 
saved in state health insurance costs in a single year as the direct 
result of the more transparent business model” akin to Maine’s 
and the District of Columbia’s regulation.144 These legislative 
efforts are effective as they reveal PBMs’ pricing strategies and 
require a heightened degree of protection to plan sponsors.145 
Nonetheless, as this Note will conclude, these solutions can be 
broadened naturally upon restoring transparent negotiations and 
consumer choice. Without these market considerations in mind, 
similar state legislative action alone will incentivize forum shop-
ping and cause health plans to transfer their suits to jurisdic-
tions with favorable legislation.146 
 As mentioned in Section I.B, President Trump’s executive 
orders are not effective, and substantively been enforced by states 
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prior to October 2018.147 According to the National Conference of 
State Legislation, thirty-three states enacted laws prohibiting 
PBM “gag clauses” as of May 2019.148 Additionally, some states 
have mandated transparency in their efforts to reduce rising drug 
cost.149 Specifically, South Dakota’s statute mandates PBMs to 
release rebate information and enforce audit rights.150 Although 
states are better suited for experimental legislation, inconsistent 
approaches are not conducive to addressing market deficiencies 
and produce costly state litigation.151 
 The Virginia legislature has been proactive in its attempts 
to regulate PBMs commercial activity.152 As early as 2015, Virginia 
required “contracts between health insurance carriers and their 
intermediaries to contain provisions that allow the parties to up-
date every seven days the maximum allowable cost list.”153 In 
addition, the 2015 legislation protects the participating pharmacy 
from PBM retaliation should it invoke its rights under any con-
tractual provision.154 Neighboring jurisdictions, such as Maryland, 
have also been active in attempts to promulgate legislation au-
thorizing the State Insurance Commissioner to require specific 
disclosures from PBMs, and “provides that a [contract] provision 
prohibiting reimbursements of a certain amount does not apply 
to reimbursements for certain drugs or to chain pharmacies.”155 
Maryland’s legislation goes so far as to regulating “how PBMs ... 
negotiate their contracts with pharmacies, including what must be 
disclosed as well as the timing for specific actions like audits.”156 
 Maryland’s legislative initiatives are unique in that they 
achieve regulation through means of negotiation and disclosure 
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requirements, rather than mandatory pricing review.157 Specifi-
cally, § 15-1601(k) directly addresses Pharmacy and Therapeutics 
Committees (P&T) as “a committee established by a [PBM] to: 
(1) objectively appraise and evaluate prescription drugs; and (2) 
make recommendations to a purchaser regarding the selection of 
drugs for the purchaser’s formulary.”158 The use of P&T’s is com-
monly used in private industry.159 For example, Blue Shield of 
California’s P&T is “made up of independent community physicians 
and pharmacists, who are not Blue Shield of California employ-
ees.”160 Similar to concepts of corporate law, P&Ts attempted to 
remove bias and presented an opportunity for state intervention 
while balancing efficient market considerations.161 Nonetheless, 
P&Ts are not being utilized as its members often lack an under-
standing of “health care system contracts and reimbursement 
strategies.”162 In other words, P&Ts must uniformly consider 
“pharmacy’s role in the total episode of care and the impact of 
pharmaceuticals on value-based reimbursement strategies”163 in 
response to furthering “total clinical outcomes in designing cost-
effective formularies.”164 
 While the effects of these state initiatives are difficult to 
measure, the Virginia legislature has continued to enforce prin-
ciples of market transparency and PBM regulation.165 Virginia 
Senator Dunnavant and Delegate Pillion introduced budget 
amendments aimed to increase PBM accountability, ensure state 
oversight of Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), and 
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mandate that pharmacies are fairly reimbursed.166 According to 
the American Pharmacists Association, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and North Carolina, state programs have the authority 
to ensure reasonable contract terms between MCOs, PBMs, and 
community pharmacies.167 Specifically, the contract terms enable 
states to track expenditures of its tax dollars because they estab-
lish reimbursement rates for pharmacy services under the fee-
for-service program.168 
 While Virginia’s legislative proposals do not go so far as to 
require contract provisions, they are aimed at protecting consumer 
choice of pharmacy providers and requiring fair treatment of 
community retail pharmacies.169 For example, Virginia H.B. 2223 
“allow[s] a covered individual to fill their prescription at any 
mail order or networking participating retail pharmacy if the 
retail pharmacy agrees to a comparable price to the mail or-
der.”170 The Bill also prohibits PBMs from charging differential 
co-payment or additional fees for a covered individual that 
chooses to fill their prescription at an in-network retail pharma-
cy instead of the mail order pharmacy.171 In accordance with the 
premise behind this Note, H.B. 2223 aims at restoring consumer 
choice to best regulate the market through state regulation of 
transparent transactions. 
 Critics of Virginia H.B. 2223 posit the bill undercuts law-
makers’ duty to “preserve the right of private contract.”172 Crit-
ics argue enabling “government overreach would restrict some of 
the practices and tools PBMs use to reach optimal deals, poten-
tially resulting in higher insurance premiums.”173 Adversaries of 
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H.B. 2223 counter, claiming “[t]he best way to lower the price of 
healthcare is to embrace free market solutions, which allow for 
competition that improves quality, increases the number of 
choices available, and naturally lowers prices.”174 
 Although the H.B. 2223 critics are correct in some of their 
general conclusions, they wrongly identify issues and falsely believe 
government intervention and free market principles are mutually 
exclusive. Provided the PBM market is operating under manipu-
lated incentives and inequitable bargaining powers, further removal 
of oversight will only lessen marketplace competition. Without 
the proper market infrastructure, as instituted through targeted 
government intervention, PBMs will operate under the smoke 
screen of free market protections while exploiting its unilateral 
bargaining power. 
 Ultimately, Virginia was reluctant to involve itself with the 
PBM market and H.B. 2223 failed the requisite vote to pass the 
Senate.175 In the wake of Virginia’s recent rejection of market 
oversight, retail pharmacies continue to face impracticable mar-
ket pressures under a regime of pricing instruments designed to 
punish customers that elect to fill a prescription via in-network 
retail community pharmacy.176 Moreover, as discussed in Section 
II.C, contract disputes will continue to be litigated and further 
produce inconsistent standards and PBM forum shopping. 
IV.MARKET SOLUTIONS 
 As a result of inconsistent state legislative approaches, 
and under a federal regime hesitant to consider comprehensive 
legislation, this Note posits private industry mechanics and 
market-based approaches will produce optimal consumer condi-
tions. These approaches are grounded in contract to “give health 
plan managers guidance regarding the tools they need to equip 
themselves to negotiate more effectively with PBMs.”177 According 
to fundamental Coasean economics: 
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Direct government regulation will not necessarily give better 
results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or 
the firm. But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an 
improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particu-
larly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nui-
sance, a large number of people are involved, and in which 
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market 
or the firm may be high.178 
These economic concepts are applicable to government al-
location just as they are to market resources.179 Similar to the 
political market, PBMs face lower transaction costs and are 
equipped for coercive bargaining, while pharmacies and consumers 
face higher transaction costs and thereby are disincentivized from 
market negotiations.180 As illustrated in Parts I and II, costs are 
imposed on those in the high-transaction-cost group, who cannot 
bargain to mitigate them.181 Applied in this Note, “[t]he Coase 
theorem implies that resources are being allocated efficiently if 
constraints are taken as given but also implies that resources 
could be allocated more efficiently if constraints can be modified 
to lower transaction costs by changing institutions.”182 Moreover, 
Coase’s solution in “The Problem of Social Cost” requires gov-
ernment intervention to allocate resources and enforce market 
optimization.183 Academics believe, “if government does the job 
properly of pricing the externalities—neither society nor business 
need suffer under a regulatory regime compared to the theoreti-
cal optimal outcome.”184 
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 According to a U.S. News report, “the prescription drug 
debate in recent years ... centered on using government not to 
mandate that drug manufacturers cut prices, but to aggregate 
consumer purchasing to drive prices down.”185 In conclusion, 
regulation can be productive if its regulatory bodies conceive 
healthcare initiatives within the same economic considerations 
as businesses.186 Targeted government regulation is necessary to 
internalize externalities, and thereby restore efficient market 
structures and negotiations to PBMs transactions and contribute 
to lower drug costs.187 
A.Free-Market Myth and Private Industry Concerns 
 The common myth that the pharmaceutical industry is free 
because its prices are not regulated is flawed in its reasoning. As 
articulated in the subsequent discussion, aggressive federal reg-
ulation is a culprit of high prescription drug cost.188 
1.Artificial Monopolies, Innovative Drugs, and “Off-Patent 
Drugs”189
 The Constitution has long recognized the importance of 
rewarding, incentivizing, and protecting innovation through the 
use of patents.190 As applied to pharmaceuticals, these protec-
tions are especially necessary presuming the high costs and risks 
of drug development.191 “But monopolies are not markets, especially 
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in the dozens of disease areas where therapeutic alternatives are 
not available.”192 Despite sunset provisions to certain patents, 
“[t]here are a number of old drugs whose patents have long ex-
pired for which prices are unusually high, because unwise [ ] 
FDA regulations effectively guarantee monopolies and prohibit 
competition.”193 Specifically, four categories of off-patent drugs 
have been the target of price inflation: (1) drugs used to treat rare 
disease; (2) preexisting drugs that were marketed before the FDA’s 
inception; (3) drugs delivered using specialized devices; and (4) 
drugs associated with significant health and/or safety issues.194 
 For purposes of this Note, analysis into the complex grants 
of off-patent or orphan drugs is unnecessary. Essentially, the fed-
eral government has manufactured competitive barriers to entry 
as many manufacturers have manipulated the federal regula-
tions to insulate themselves from competition.195 
 This begs the question: are there available remedies vested 
in existing antitrust regulations? The answer is limited, as “in-
surers are prevented by federal and state antitrust laws from 
jointly negotiating reimbursement rates for innovative drugs 
[within] [ ] a given region.”196 Therefore, federal regulations, as 
applied to innovative drugs, secure monopolies to drug manufac-
turers, while simultaneously prohibiting insurers from collectively 
negotiating with its suppliers.197 
 Eliminating market barriers to promote competition and 
lower consumer costs is not radical and has been effective in com-
parative industries.198 While subsequent sections will expound 
upon market-based solutions, it is worthy to discuss the restruc-
turing of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDA Act”).199 The 
FDA Act was designed to expedite drug products to life-threatening 
medical demand.200 Avik Roy, President of the Foundation for 
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Research on Equal Opportunity, suggests Congress could amend 
the FDA Act to expand its expedited provision “to drugs being 
developed for diseases where only one or two FDA-approved 
drugs can be considered to represent the standard of care.”201 
According to Roy, restructuring the FDA Act would “advance the 
public’s interest in mitigating the adverse impact of monopolies 
and duopolies.”202 Notwithstanding Roy’s competition-based 
approach, the underlying problem persists, that is, patients’ lack 
of control over assets expended on their behalf, and prevailing 
opaque market conditions.203 
2.PCMA’s Market-Based Solution 
 The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
arranged hearings examining “methods and reasoning behind 
recent drug price increases.”204 Responding to these concerns, 
Mark Merritt, President and CEO of the Pharmaceutical Care 
Management Association (PCMA), “outlined market-based policy 
solutions to help increase competition and lower prescription drug 
costs.”205 While this Note approaches Merritt’s statements with 
skepticism, he correctly articulated “[t]he pricing tactics discussed 
today are just one piece of a much larger puzzle.”206 Specifically, 
Merritt outlined the following as viable market-based solutions: (1) 
accelerating FDA approvals of me-too drug brands against drugs 
facing no competition; (2) accelerating FDA approval of generics to 
compete with off-patent brands facing no competition; (3) generate 
a government “watch list” of all off-patent brands, thereby putting 
acquirers on alert that policymakers can monitor these situations; 
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and (4) mandating co-pay coupons as illegal kickbacks for all 
insurance companies that receive federal subsidy.207 
 In theory, the PCMA’s argument purports to increase 
competition through broader consumer choice.208 However, it fails to 
address market transparency.209 This is likely due to PBMs fear 
of transparency litigation. In fact, “[t]he PBM industry argues that 
legislation mandating disclosure will harm the PBM industry 
and reduce the discounts that the PBMs are able to negotiate on 
behalf of health plans.”210 Former policy director for the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), David Balto, responded to PCMA’s 
transparency concerns, calling them “inconsistent with economic 
theory, antitrust law and common sense.”211 Consequently, PCMA’s 
argument falls short of its purported market-based solution. Under 
this proposal, PBMs would still be encouraged to weaponize pric-
ing strategies, reap benefits from spread pricing, and ultimately, 
consumers would remain uninformed and powerless.212 
B.Transparent Markets and Contracting Tenants 
 Market transparency has long been a concern of regulatory 
agencies. According to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 
transparency “plays a fundamental role in the fairness and effi-
ciency of the secondary markets” and “transparency [helps] to 
link dispersed markets and improves the price discovery, fair-
ness, competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. markets.”213 As 
applied to PBMs, its market power is derived from streams of 
market share but also “from the paucity of information available 
to those who deal with the PBMs.”214 Naturally, transparency 
contributes to efficient dealings and discourages controversial 
industry practices.215 
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 For example, attorneys general from twenty states settled 
claims under deceptive trade practices actions against Medco 
Health Solutions, Inc.216 According to the New York Attorney 
General, “[t]his case show[ed] how [PBMs] previously hid from 
consumers, doctors and health plans that they were switching 
prescriptions to promote their own profits.”217 Garrett & Garis 
articulate that these practices are readily prevented when negotiat-
ing parties are equipped with transparent negotiating power 
backed by statutory enforcement.218 Furthermore, Garrett’s article 
posits a plausible market-based solution, utilizing nonprofit pass 
through PBMs that provide complete transparency to plans.219 
 According to Garrett’s nonprofit concept, setting up the 
“PBM could be [done] through a joint venture arrangement among 
the plans, the system could be licensed, or the plans could simply 
pay a processing fee calculated on a per-covered life or per-
transaction basis.”220 These independent, or transparent PBMs, 
pledge to conduct business in accordance with a set of guiding 
principles by the NCPA that align the interests of patients, em-
ployers, and community pharmacies.221 Ideally, these entities 
would focus on formulary management.222 According to Bestie’s 
Employee Benefit Review, “transparent model PBMs focus on 
evidence-based formulary development, objective clinical review, 
and lowest net costs.”223 Some transparent PBM models even open 
its committee meetings to clients, and make available all minutes 
for client review.224 Bestie concludes, under transparent PBMs 
models, “the results are clearly visible, and clients can feel very 
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comfortable in a pay-for-performance setting.”225 Furthermore, 
because transparent PBM incentives are aligned with that of its 
clients, retained discounts are passed directly back to its clients.226 
However, even a transparent PBM may not disclose all of its con-
tracts nor eliminate self-serving incentives.227 Therefore, statutes 
should encourage transparent entity formation while enforcing 
fiduciary duties in negotiation efforts. 
 Standardized contracting has also been suggested to reduce 
transactional costs and empower consumer choice.228 Standard-
ized contracts mitigate administrative obstacles associated with 
collaborative health plans negotiating with a large number of 
sponsors.229 Thus, subject to the limitations in Part V, these 
contracts would shorten the negotiation process, increase parties’ 
familiarity with contract terms, restrict room for deviation, and 
aid in establishing a uniform body of common law. 
C.Role of Pharmacists 
 Pharmacists play a significant role within any healthcare 
regime. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Compe-
tition suggests pharmacists critical nexus to effective management 
“result[s] [from their] face-to-face service and personal relation-
ships” which enable them to “help patients manage lifestyle choices, 
[and] monitor and improve drug adherence.”230 Under this Note’s 
market-based approach, in conjunction with federal gag-clause 
prohibition, pharmacists can empower consumers and send signals 
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to the market via product choice.231 Community pharmacies rely on 
transparent information exchanges, which “provid[es] them [with] 
the important groundwork to have access to patients medical 
records which will help them coordinate care with other provid-
ers.”232 However, unlike some community pharmacies, pharmacists 
are not charged with the duty to negotiate with customers and 
provide cheaper drug alternatives.233 In other words, the federal 
executive orders that grant pharmacists the ability to fully inform 
customer choice, do not place the onus on pharmacist for every 
transaction.234 Consequently, pharmacists’ unique nexus to con-
sumer choice continues to be under-utilized and dilutes the effect 
of legislative initiatives.235 
V.CONTRACT AND MARKET MORALITY 
 Collectively applying these considerations, it’s important 
to revisit the instrument at the apex of all PBM market debates. 
That is, the contract between plan sponsors and PBMs contracted 
pharmacies. Examining these contracts, and their formation, is 
critical as contract law’s purpose has been linked to supporting 
robust markets.236 Moreover, Professor Nathan Oman, William & 
Mary Law Professor and Co-Chair of the Center for the Study of 
Law and Markets, suggests even agreements not connected to 
well-functioning markets should be enforced, if only to develop 
new well-functioning markets.237 Oman’s approach to boilerplate 
contracts, while correctly focused on market behavior, should not be 
applied to the PBM market until some degree of correction occurs. 
 Despite Oman’s well-reasoned support of boilerplate or 
standardized contracts, when applied to the current PBM market, 
the logic conflicts. The use of these contracts in murky, abused, 
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and opaque markets is far more costly than the implied fear of 
transaction costs when obtaining consent.238 Similar to the fidu-
ciary context of an expert and lay person, PBMs are sophisticated 
and enter contract negotiations with unmatched negotiating 
power.239 Accordingly, while I agree with Oman’s thesis, the PBM 
industry must first become educated regarding the complex ex-
changes through transparency legislation, coupled with increased 
competition, compulsory pharmacist interaction, independent pass 
through entities, and sufficient negotiation structures. Upon balanc-
ing these interests, the PBM market will become vested with the 
necessary prerequisites for efficient laissez-faire exchanges, aimed 
to reach the economically desired outcome. Once achieved, Oman’s 
argument should then be applied to boilerplate contracts to lower 
transaction costs and support the new well-functioning market. 
In summation, contract law, under the proper conditions, is cor-
related with positive cultivation of transparency values. 
CONCLUSION 
 Until recently, PBMs have evaded examination because 
most consumers are unaware of their existence and fail to un-
derstand the complex transactional process.240 While there still 
rests a heavy educational burden upon PBM market players, one 
thing remains, mere legislative efforts, without market considera-
tions, are insufficient to correcting the imbalance. The PBM mar-
ket remains a small piece within the larger healthcare industry.241 
However, PBM market regulation is functionally necessary when 
addressing prescription drug costs. Legislative efforts continue 
to fall short of effective business-reasoned policy and undermine 
the markets ability to facilitate efficient results when under 
corrected incentives.242 Competition within the PBM market, 
underpinned through the discussed transparency solutions, will 
lower drug costs and restore consumer purchasing power with-
out clouding the market with burdensome legislation. 
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